The Kremlin has set deadlines for the occupation of Donetsk region. By the end of April — Konstantinovka, and by the end of the year — reaching the region’s borders. Frankly, we have long stopped laughing at such precise calendar deadlines — there have been too many of them. On the other hand, such dates are not entirely illogical when tied to political plans. So let’s evaluate them by two parameters. First — how necessary this really is for the Kremlin in terms of timing. Second — the realism of the plans. We won’t even consider taking the entire Donetsk region by June, given the sheer fantasy of that optimism.
Let’s start with Konstantinovka, where the planning horizon is closer and it’s easier to make assessments. Currently, the enemy is actively working on the flanks, east and west of the city. They have long tried to break through head-on with little result. Although enemy troops are indeed on both sides of the railway and the Kryviy Torets River — advancing from south to north — they have long entered the southern outskirts of Konstantinovka and stalled. There was a whole story there with their usual optimistic reports, detached from reality. The 51st Army was supposed to clear the approach to the city, after which the 8th Army, reinforced, was to push into Konstantinovka and advance through Druzhkovka toward Kramatorsk. The 51st Army wore itself down in assaults on the city but reported the mission as completed. After that, the 8th Army was sent in — which… simply replaced the 51st in the fights on the outskirts.
Currently, the conditional front line in and around the city is the T0504 “Bakhmut – Pokrovsk” highway, which crosses Konstantinovka as Miroshnichenko Street. Since the enemy cannot cross it in the city, their main efforts are now focused on advancing along the flanks: from Bakhmut near Stupochok, and west through Berestok toward Ilyinovka and Stepanovka. The key question — if they succeed in advancing along the flanks, where will they try to cut the connection with Kramatorsk and Druzhkovka? There are two parallel roads along the river — the main highway to the east, and one through private sector areas to the west. Will they have enough forces to move along both banks simultaneously? If they had results west near Ilyinovka, the eastern corridor is still contested due to fights around Chasiv Yar.
To summarize: the real situation on the ground has not changed for a couple of months. Attempts to break into Konstantinovka or bypass the city from the flanks are blocked by the T0504 highway. What will fundamentally change in April? Nothing. That is, it is safe to say that taking Konstantinovka by storm, infiltration, or encirclement by May will not be possible. This trend can probably be extended to the entire Donetsk region by the end of the year.
Kramatorsk? They can push toward it from the east, from the Severesk side. The enemy even has some success there. And then?
Storming Kramatorsk head-on from one side without being able to bypass or cut logistics? They would get a new Bakhmut — only twice the size and population. Plus Sloviansk and Druzhkovka are just satellite cities, each the size of Bakhmut. And the enemy today has nowhere near the reserves or capabilities required. The flanks are Konstantinovka from the south, and to the north is a large area under our control, protected by the river. So the goal of taking the entire Donetsk region by the end of the year seems unrealistic.
How long did they say we were supposed to leave voluntarily, or “it would be worse”? Two months? Against this backdrop, the erotic daydreams of a gloomy teenager about Angelina Jolie start to look quite realistic.
