At present, in the Southern operational zone, the Russian command is trying to solve a rather complex operational-tactical “dual” task — simultaneously continue encircling the Orikhiv defensive district of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and urgently “put out the fire” of successful Ukrainian counterattacks on the flanks of the forces involved in this operation, namely the “Vostok” and “Dnipro” groups (sectors of the 29th, 36th, and 58th Army Corps).
For this purpose, a significant portion of the units of the 120th Marine Infantry Division and additionally the 40th Separate Marine Brigade were “relocated” from the junction of the 51st and 8th Army Corps (in other words, from the junction of the “Center” and “South” operational commands), effectively interrupting the process of restoring their combat readiness.
Therefore, the Russian command may face, let’s say, certain difficulties with the process of restoring offensive capabilities of the “Center” operational command, primarily in terms of timing. In this sense, I think that the “deadline of the Russian ultimatum” regarding the demand to remove Ukrainian forces “from Donbas” (as stated verbatim in the official Russian statement), set at 2 months, clearly did not arise by accident.
No one disputes that it is quite possible the Russian operational-strategic command could scrape together some reserves for the needs of the “Center” operational command (possibly even from their strategic “stockpiles,” which they have been filling since last fall). But doing so will be very difficult, and clearly — not very fast.
For example, even the tactical groups (TGr) of the “South” operational command, currently attacking the Konstantinovka defensive district of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (in other words, solving a “highly relevant” operational-tactical task for the upcoming summer offensive), essentially represent a patchwork “mix” of units and formations from several armies and an army corps across three different Russian groupings. This makes it clear that “free” reserves at the Russian command’s disposal are in short supply.
It’s already April, and Konstantinovka continues to “hold,” which means that a southern advance to the approaches to Kramatorsk before summer is still postponed. Moreover, the 51st Army Corps of the “Center” operational command, which could assist the 8th Army Corps and the 3rd Army Corps involved in this operation, currently itself requires, let’s say, “substantial reformatting” (in other words, reinforcement and restoration of combat capabilities).
Therefore, in my view, if we see reinforcements for the “Center” operational command in the near future (including strategic-level reserves), it is quite possible that this will involve not the entire grouping of forces, but only the 51st Army Corps.
And lastly. The Russian command’s plan to break through to Dobropillia from the south, right along the center of the entire operational zone of the “Center” command (in the sector of the 2nd Army Corps), in the context of the upcoming summer campaign, which will most likely resemble a Sloviansk-Kramatorsk operational offensive, appears, to put it mildly, somewhat questionable. For two main reasons:
The first reason — Dobropillia is clearly “off to the side” (meaning, off the direct path to Kramatorsk), which objectively leads to dispersion of forces and assets, both along the front and over time (which is even more important).
The second reason — a hypothetical breakthrough to Dobropillia and its subsequent assault (which in itself will not be a quick operation) will require significant forces and resources that could have been used on the Kramatorsk axis. Moreover, the reinforced forces of the “Center” command, in the upcoming battles for Dobropillia, will most likely be worn down again, making it impossible to use them later in operations toward Kramatorsk or Sloviansk. Or, at best, the effect will be minimal.
I suspect that the demand to “take Dobropillia” is driven by military rationale rather than some “whims” from behind the Kremlin walls (like, “well, just take Dobropillia at least”). Therefore, it is quite possible that Russian forces will continue, with the persistence of a ram, to crawl northwest of Pokrovsk…
