In the first quarter of 2026, Russia signed contracts with approximately 70,500 soldiers. This was below the target set by the Ministry of Defense, which had planned for 33,500–34,600 recruits per month. While in the same quarter of 2025 around 1,200 people enlisted in the army daily on average, that figure has now dropped to 800–930 against a planned target of 1,100–1,150.
The first thing the Kremlin did was raise the stakes. More than 40 regions increased one-time payments for new recruits by 30–100%, and in some cases by 200–500% compared to levels at the end of 2025. Ordinary Russians are paying for this generosity: in order to scrape together money for military bonuses, regional authorities have cut spending on social services and utilities amid record budget deficits.
For its part, the State Duma passed a law on writing off overdue loans — not only for the contract soldier himself, but also for his wife or husband. The condition is a contract signed from May 1, 2026, for a term of at least one year. The maximum amount eligible for cancellation is $136,700. According to Russia’s Central Bank, at the beginning of 2026 the volume of overdue unsecured consumer debt reached $22.6 billion, while the number of enforcement proceedings against individuals exceeded 25 million. In other words, the potential target audience for this incentive may include nearly every fourth adult Russian.
At the same time, the Kremlin launched mechanisms that can hardly be described as voluntary. In Ryazan region, companies with more than 150 employees were required to send a fixed number of workers into the army. Similar situations exist in other regions. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, together with military enlistment offices, tasked the administrations of 190–200 technical and regional universities with ensuring that at least 2% of male students sign military contracts.
Pressure is also increasing from above. The Prosecutor General’s Office has been granted authority for total oversight of conscription — from military enlistment offices and employers to schools, universities, and security agencies. The State Duma also enshrined in law the obligation of law enforcement agencies to conduct “preventive work” with those refusing military service. In effect, the prosecutor’s office is becoming yet another tool of mobilization administration.
Another figure is equally telling: the number of prisoners in Russia has fallen to its lowest level since the early 2000s — from 465,000 at the end of 2021 to 282,000 now. The head of the Federal Penitentiary Service explained this simply: people are being sent to war.
Taken together, all these measures paint a pessimistic picture for Moscow. Voluntary military contracts are becoming increasingly expensive in the literal sense — both for budgets and for the social sectors of the regions. The debt-relief incentive also has limits: payments cannot be raised indefinitely, while regional authorities are already deeply in deficit. Open mobilization still appears to be an unlikely scenario for now — the Kremlin is afraid to announce it publicly. But the further the pace of voluntary recruitment declines, the less hypothetical that question becomes.
