I think attempts to strike Red Square on May 9 are pointless. Let’s assume we send 800–1,000 drones, of which 95–98% will be shot down. A couple of unlucky drones might get through and fall somewhere, but while it would be pleasant to see the frightened faces of Muscovites, in essence it would change nothing.
Germany bombed Moscow during World War II far more intensively than Ukraine is doing now. And London was bombed even more intensively than Moscow. However, they still lost the war, because the Allies did not respond with symbolic strikes alone, although those existed as well.
In August 1941, the USSR carried out night bombing raids on Berlin using DB-3F bombers from bases in the Baltic Sea. These strikes had no real consequences beyond informational noise, and three months later the Germans were already near Moscow.
The Allies struck strategic targets. While the British preferred carpet bombing of cities, the Americans concluded that this was ineffective and that it was necessary to hit strategic targets such as ball-bearing factories or synthetic fuel plants. Speer wrote that Germany lost the war in May 1944, when the Allies destroyed a critical ball-bearing production plant.
In our case, it is senseless to spend $50–60 million just to create a few thousand frightened faces in Moscow. It would be better to destroy strategic infrastructure around and within several regional centers, inflicting hundreds of millions in damage. This is logical at least from an economic perspective. Russia is 15–20 times larger than us economically, and we cannot spend limited resources on symbolic effects. We need to act asymmetrically, not symmetrically.
For example, Zelensky’s visit to Yerevan was such an asymmetric move. It cost almost nothing economically, but in essence it was an act that humiliated Putin and delighted the Armenian elite and population. Zelensky came to a country where Russian intelligence services are strong, and the President of Ukraine was genuinely taking a risk. Therefore, the signal was correctly received and essentially could not have been missed. Yet its cost to Ukraine was minimal.
This is how we should act going forward.
We need less theater and more strategic logic.
The Tuapse strike demonstrated a shift in operational focus that is especially costly for Russia.
