By Vladislav Inozemtsev for Kremlyovsky Bezbashennik
The U.S. and Israeli attack on Iran was as inevitable as the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime once was. It demonstrated that, despite all the propaganda about the “rise” of the “Global South,” the decline and collapse of the Westernized order, and so on, regimes perceived in Washington as posing a serious threat have no real chance of survival. You can be a Western opponent, but not its enemy—otherwise, neither strategic agreements with Putin nor the supply of the most advanced weapons from Xi make any difference. It is worth noting that the Iranian case is particularly notable: the U.S. stopped looking for justifications for aggression or regime change and decided to “strike preemptively.” I wouldn’t be surprised if, before the end of Trump’s term, Kim Jong Un and one of the lesser-known Cuban leaders join Maduro and Khamenei on the list.
The most interesting question now, in my view, is whether it will be possible not only to destroy the regime hated by Jerusalem and Washington, but also to establish a new, “normal” state. There is a chance, but I wouldn’t overestimate it. The fanatical clerics have made countless enemies, but on the other hand, they also cultivated millions of loyal supporters (not fanatics, but people who profitably sold their loyalty to the regime). Meanwhile, their enemies do not necessarily share a common vision for the country’s future—many do not even consider its preservation necessary. After the 1979 “revolution,” millions fled Iran; today, the diaspora of over 4 million people is spread across fifty countries. Most welcomed the invasion, but it’s hard to imagine that anyone in Europe or the U.S. (except perhaps the crown prince) is ready to return to Iran “on the first flight.” Internal opposition exists in isolation, while the Kurds and Azerbaijanis have long aspired to their own statehood. Consequently, those who served the outgoing regime will likely find a place in the new authorities, which will almost certainly aim to preserve the country as a single entity. A simple future for Iran is not in sight.
In this respect, Iran is similar to Russia. All attention is currently focused on the current regimes in these countries, which are rightly considered aggressive and tyrannical. However, their predecessors were far from models of just governance—they left behind so many political “landmines” that demilitarizing or stabilizing a new government may be impossible.
That is why, in my view, the focus should not be on how Mossad tracked foreign leaders or how the IDF eliminated them (special security units [as in Venezuela], S-400 systems [as in Iran], or nuclear weapons [as in North Korea] will not prevent a repeat).
The real question is what prospects exist for a society that has endured two dictatorships in the past hundred years, been shaped by medieval ideologies, and been consumed by hatred for a neighboring people who harmed it not at all—whose defeat, even by the fourth year of Russia’s war, proved immensely difficult. Understanding this will be extremely valuable for us.
