By Dr. Dmitri Stratievski, PhD, political scientist, historian, Director of the Berlin Center for the Study of Eastern Europe fo The Moscow Times
Carsten Breuer, Inspector General of the Bundeswehr (the highest-ranking military officer in the German armed forces), signed Germany’s Military Strategy. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius presented it to the public. The full title of the document is: “General Concept of Military Defense. Military Strategy and Plan for the Armed Forces. Responsibility for Europe.” This is the first such strategy in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. Forty pages of the document were published on the German Ministry of Defense website. The main text, as well as details of defensive plans and the Bundeswehr’s combat capabilities, are of course classified.
Why did Germany not have a military strategy, unlike most major European and global powers? What do the open provisions of the document contain, and which plans will be difficult to implement?
Pacifism and strategy
In public perception, two terms that differ significantly in meaning are often confused: military doctrine and military strategy. If a state has armed forces, it also has a military doctrine — in the form of an officially published document and classified provisions.
It is a system of fundamental views and approaches to a country’s participation in warfare. In the modern world, almost all states declare a defensive doctrine, rejecting aggression and refusing first use of weapons of mass destruction, or allowing their use only in exceptional cases of existential threat (for members of the “nuclear club” — nuclear weapons). Even if a military doctrine is not formulated as a single text, its elements are inevitably reflected in foreign policy concepts and legislation, often including the constitution.
In Germany, military doctrine has traditionally been an integral part of foreign policy and consists of two key segments: “written” and “unwritten.” The “unwritten” part can be understood as a social contract formed after the establishment of the fundamentally new West German state in 1949. It is a rejection of aggression, militarism, and militarization, a defensive orientation, and a commitment to peacekeeping.
Some elements are codified in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, the “White Paper on Security Policy” (2016), the National Security Concept (2023, also introduced for the first time), and the Foreign Ministry Guidelines (2017, with amendments in 2025). These define the Bundeswehr as a defensive army under parliamentary control, closely integrated into NATO and linked to the European Union, based on multilateralism and the unconditional priority of diplomacy over the use of military force. In other words, Bundeswehr units may only be deployed in the event of unavoidable military confrontation, to defend Germany and its allies, or as part of peacekeeping operations mandated by the UN or NATO.
Military strategy, by contrast, involves concrete planning. It is a set of measures taken in the event of rising threat levels or the outbreak of war, taking into account circumstances and available resources. Germany’s pacifist state model, its reluctance to act as a major geopolitical player, the absence of significant conventional threats in Europe, and confidence in the stability of NATO commitments created a perception that military solutions were secondary. The close integration with NATO made a separate German military strategy seem unnecessary. Of course, the Bundeswehr command and the Ministry of Defense undoubtedly had plans for strategic deployment, mobilization, and necessary instructions for a “zero hour” scenario, but no military strategy was presented to the public as such.
New times
The “Zeitenwende” (turning point) announced in February 2022 by then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz already marked a fundamental shift in Germany’s approach to the armed forces and the defense industry. Allocating record sums for the rearmament of the Bundeswehr was the first major step, but the strategy itself still needed conceptual formulation.
A year later, the National Security Strategy of Germany introduced the concept of “deterrence,” an instrument widely used by the United States and the Western world against the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, but previously foreign to Germany, which had relied on dialogue and cultural-economic convergence. Repeated statements by German politicians about their desire to make the Bundeswehr the strongest army in Europe, combined with recognition of threats from Russia, also signaled the emergence of a new document related to broader foreign policy principles, but of a specifically military nature. The weakening cohesion of NATO, made evident after Donald Trump’s return to the White House, required Berlin to take greater responsibility for security. Finally, a unified strategic plan was expected from Germany by its European allies.
The open part of Germany’s military strategy contains six main principles.
For the first time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, a potential adversary and threat to national security is clearly identified: the Russian Federation. The authors of the strategy assume that by 2029 Moscow will be capable of launching aggression against Germany or its allies.
It proposes to rethink the foundations of modern military strategy in light of Russia’s current and future capabilities and the experience of the Russian–Ukrainian war, including the role of UAVs and, consequently, a fully transparent battlefield, artificial intelligence, and hybrid forms of influence on the adversary. German planners propose moving away from the “standard” assessment of military strength based on counting tanks, aircraft, and ships, and focusing instead on technologies enabling deep strikes against targets in the enemy rear. To implement such plans, a solid financial base is envisaged: spending three percent of GDP on defense already next year.
The document proposes a three-stage approach to Bundeswehr combat readiness: readiness to fight immediately if necessary, as well as in 2029 and 2039 (the respective year of Russia’s assumed ability to attack Europe and the year of completion of Germany’s military reform). Special attention is given to mobility and transport capabilities.
The year 2039 is indicated as a new horizon. By then, the Bundeswehr is to become a high-tech and the strongest non-nuclear army in the EU, capable of independently carrying out the most complex military tasks. This is a more realistic approach than earlier political statements that did not set timeframes but suggested rapid strengthening. The plan foresees an increase in personnel to 460,000 troops, significantly more than previously announced, although the current figure also includes reservists.
A multilateral approach is preserved. Moreover, the authors of the document further emphasize the key function of the Bundeswehr — to be capable of operating in close cooperation with NATO allies and ready to defend the territory of Alliance member states. Germany must, if necessary, be able to serve as the main transit hub, a European military logistics center for the transfer of troops and cargo to the east.
The text repeatedly mentions the United States. The U.S. is still recognized as NATO’s main military power and Germany’s most important partner, but at the same time it is diplomatically noted that Washington is reducing its activity in Europe and focusing on the Americas and the Indo-Pacific region. The authors refer to the new U.S. National Defense Strategy, which calls on allies to increase their own defense efforts.
The document also sets out four German military-strategic priorities:
- Deterrence and the ability to actively defend its own territory and that of allies.
- Minimizing the impact of hybrid threats.
- Strengthening the stability of the EU and its southern neighbors.
- Protection of international waterways and lines of communication.
Plans and reality
There remains some uncertainty as to whether detailed planning already exists for each individual point. For example, it is unclear whether there is a phased plan to turn Germany into a military transport hub. Rapid movement of hundreds of thousands of people and tons of cargo would require a fundamental overhaul of the road and railway network, and Germany has already been facing major transport infrastructure problems in recent years. However, this information remains in the “classified” part of the strategy.
Overall, the published provisions of the document are not a sensation. Rather, they represent a political continuation of the course already pursued since 2022 by two consecutive federal governments. Berlin has acknowledged the changed realities and is trying to adapt, recognizing that confrontation with Russia is becoming long-term. The strategy is a statement of a “Cold War 2,” in which the probability of escalation into a “hot” phase is not zero. And the authors, overcoming Germany’s mental barriers of pacifism and Russophilia, call things by their names.
An open question remains whether the provisions of the document are fully implementable. Germany is managing to significantly increase its defense potential. Over four years, the number of defense enterprises in the country has doubled, reaching 550 (+200 in 2024–2025 alone). There is even emerging competition between federal states to host factories, bringing new jobs, infrastructure, and state contracts. Flagship German defense companies (Airbus Defence and Space, MBDA, Diehl Defence, KNDS, and others), previously concentrated in the western part of the country, are increasingly focusing on eastern German regions. There is no doubt that the industrial and technical components of the plans can be implemented in practice. Germany has the necessary financial, industrial, scientific, and human resources.
Much more difficult will be achieving the planned personnel strength of the Bundeswehr. Even in the near future, despite progress and artificial intelligence, people will remain indispensable. But given deep-rooted anti-war traditions and high salaries in the civilian economy, doubling the size of the armed forces will be very difficult.
In the first three months of this year, more Germans applied for exemption from military service than in all of 2024. Observers link this trend to the entry into force of the new military service law in Germany. Young people are now required to answer a question about their willingness to join the Bundeswehr. Many Germans see this as a certain risk. The government does not intend to return to conscription, but a lottery-based recruitment system is not excluded if voluntary enlistment fails to reach required numbers. In German cities, protests are taking place even against the theoretical possibility of forced recruitment, and protest graffiti can be seen on building facades and pavements.
From a “special” state in relation to all things military, Germany is becoming an “ordinary” country with a clear defense plan. However, the German political class will need to make considerable efforts to implement the ambitious goals set out in the strategy. The main “battle” will be for the minds of its citizens.
