By Viktor Yahun
In modern counterterrorism practice, the main weapon against sabotage is not only satellites and technical interception of information, but above all the people around us.
According to European statistics, 70–80% of planned terrorist attacks are foiled thanks to citizen reports. This is called community intelligence — a systematic interaction between the community and security services. Ukraine has unique experience since 2014: the self-defense of Maidan, volunteer battalions, the DFTG-TRo networks, volunteer channels, and police cooperation with locals in de-occupied territories. It was the calls from neighbors that helped locate weapon stockpiles, spot coordinators, and identify sabotage groups. This is our real rear-line shield.
Russia is moving toward a cheap terrorist war: recruiting through Telegram, teen couriers, remote detonations, renting apartments as storage, infrastructure reconnaissance. In this war, victory goes to those who notice strange behavior faster. If communities stay silent, the Russian forces gain time. If communities work together with security services, attacks are stopped at the planning stage.
What needs to be done: each community should have a police liaison officer, a clear hotline number, and a chat-bot from the SSU or military administration. Short instructions for residents: suspicious rentals without documents, attempts to photograph critical sites, bulk chemical purchases, unusual offers of “cash jobs” via messengers. Reporting should become normal, not heroic. But there should be no vigilante actions or panic — only official channels and trust in the state.
The Russian forces understand this, so they launch information-psychological operations against community intelligence. Standard indicators:
- “The SSU does nothing” — to discourage reporting;
- “Reporting is informing” — to paralyze communities;
- “All attacks are internal disputes” — to remove responsibility from Russia;
- “Better to stay silent to avoid trouble” — to give saboteurs time.
As soon as you see such messages, it is a sign of the Russian information machine at work.
Community intelligence is not total control, but societal solidarity in war. Britain has Neighbourhood Watch, France has Vigipirate (the national security system for alerting terrorist threat levels), Germany has local crime prevention councils. Ukraine can become a model of modern counterterrorism interaction for Europe because we are already living in a new type of war.
Security is not only the work of the SSU or National Police. It is a culture of community responsibility. A vigilant neighbor, a cashier’s call, a driver’s alert, or a student’s message can save dozens of lives. In war, the rear is a front. Every community either becomes part of the security system or becomes a target.
