The counterintelligence of the Security Service of Ukraine has identified an officer of Hungarian military intelligence who was running an agent network uncovered by the SSU in Zakarpattia in the spring of 2025.
At that time, the Security Service detained two members of the spy cell who were collecting data on the region’s military defenses, local socio-political sentiments, and the possible reaction of the population in the event of Hungarian troops being deployed there.
According to the case materials, the activities of the foreign agent network were coordinated by a staff officer of Hungarian military intelligence, Zoltan Andre.
It was established that he held agent meetings in Hungary with one of his informants from Zakarpattia, who was spying in western Ukraine and was later detained by SSU counterintelligence.
The investigation found that from 2016 to 2020, Andre was in Georgia, where he conducted intelligence activities under the cover of a representative of Hungary’s diplomatic mission.
After returning from the South Caucasus, he began intelligence and subversive activities against Ukraine in 2021.
That same year, he personally recruited a former serviceman from Berehove district and placed him in a “standby mode.” In September 2024, Andre “activated” the agent and instructed him to conduct espionage activities in Zakarpattia.f
It was documented that the agent gathered intelligence on the locations of the Defense Forces, in particular attempting to identify combat positions of Ukrainian air defense protecting the skies of the western region of Ukraine.
On Andre’s instructions, the agent was also tasked with identifying potential “candidates” for recruitment into the Hungarian military intelligence network. Former and active Ukrainian servicemen, as well as law enforcement officers, were of particular interest to the foreign intelligence officer.
In addition, according to available data, Andre used the capabilities of Hungarian diplomatic institutions in Zakarpattia for recruitment purposes, where local residents submitted personal data in applications for Hungarian citizenship.
To recruit individuals, the foreign intelligence officer promised money and various benefits from Hungary.
It was established that Andre usually conducted recruitment conversations and agent meetings in his own car. For secrecy, he used an operational alias.
Another individual recruited by Andre was a former contract soldier from one of the combat brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, who was later detained by the Security Service along with another agent.
Another serviceman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was also identified, whom the Hungarian military intelligence officer attempted to recruit. Instead of monetary compensation, he promised this individual regular supplies of narcotic substances for “personal use.”
At present, SBU counterintelligence continues comprehensive measures to identify all members of the Hungarian agent network that operated against Ukraine. Each of those involved will be found and held accountable for crimes against the state.
