The Russian “Western” group of forces (GF) continues an operational offensive on the Lyman direction, the main objective of which is for Russian troops to reach the immediate approaches to the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the northeast.
The execution of this operational task apparently involves encirclement, assault, and subsequent capture of the city of Lyman, elimination of the entire Lyman bridgehead held by Ukrainian forces, and the advance of this group’s troops to the Siverskyi Donets River along a wide front (from Sviatohirsk to Zakytne), followed by a highly likely forced crossing of the river in a southern and southwestern direction.
To accomplish this task, the command of the Russian GF “Western” has deployed forces from two of its combined-arms armies — the 20th and 25th CA — reinforced in part by units of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st Tank Army.
At present, their command is apparently focused on establishing convenient “starting” (initial) positions for the encirclement and assault of Lyman.
In addition, the forces of the left flank of the Russian GF “Western” (primarily the 25th CA) are attempting to provide maximum support to the troops of the Russian GF “Southern” (3rd CA), advancing south of the Siverskyi Donets directly on the Sloviansk axis.
Therefore, at the tactical level, the following enemy actions can be expected in the near future:
- In the sector of the 20th CA: the enemy will likely attempt to achieve two objectives simultaneously — to take control of the Yarova–Novoselivka–Drobysheve–Pryshyb area, with a possible advance to the line Aleksandrivka–Sosnove to block the Ukrainian defense in Lyman from the northwest, and to attempt a breakthrough to the northern outskirts of Lyman via Drobysheve and Stavky.
- In the sector of the 25th CA: the enemy will probably continue active assault operations from Zarechne and Yampol directly toward Lyman, attempting to consolidate positions on the southern and southeastern outskirts of the city. They are also likely to continue “rolling back” Ukrainian defenses along the northern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River (possibly advancing toward Brusivka and Staryi Karavan) and to provide support to the Russian 3rd CA (GF “Southern”) advancing along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets in the directions of Zakytne–Kryva Luka and Svyato-Pokrovske–Reznykivka.
In other words, across nearly the entire perimeter of the Lyman bridgehead held by Ukrainian forces, continued enemy attacks of varying intensity can be expected.
However, at the operational level, the further prospects of Russian forces on the Lyman axis appear far from straightforward. This is primarily due to the very slow pace at which they are completing their current tactical tasks, which in turn significantly delays their ability to achieve operational objectives in this direction.
It is likely that Russian command intends to fully accomplish these tasks on the Lyman axis by mid-to-late spring of this year (similar to the Kramatorsk–Kostiantynivka axis), in order to be able to commence a direct offensive against the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration from May–June.
In other words, the enemy has a relatively limited timeframe to assault and capture Lyman (to eliminate the Ukrainian Lyman bridgehead). At the same time, the situation on the Lyman axis currently is such that the 20th and 25th Russian combined-arms armies do not yet have the capacity to begin an assault on the city itself, even though small infantry (assault) groups have reached its outskirts. In essence, both Russian armies are bogged down in tactical engagements around Lyman, and any progress is minimal, even by tactical standards.
To be able to assault the city itself, a substantial reinforcement of Russian forces in the sectors of the 20th and 25th CA would clearly be required, along with the redeployment of additional troops and assets, primarily assault infantry. Previous three-month-long battles in this direction, including advances of roughly 15 km, have come at a high cost for both Russian armies (they regularly rank among the top three Russian groupings in terms of casualties in other directions).
The problem is that Russian command is unlikely to be able to draw on reserves from the Western group of forces itself. This group is currently heavily engaged in intense fighting on the Kupiansk axis, and its main striking force — the 1st Tank Army (comprising three full-strength divisions plus a separate motorized rifle brigade) — is fully committed there. Even the forces and assets that Russian command had managed to scrape together from the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division for the Lyman axis may need to be redeployed back to Kupiansk.
Therefore, to assault Lyman itself, Russian command will need to bring in forces and assets either from other operational zones or deploy some of its strategic reserves. This will require significant time and resources.
If the battle for Lyman drags on, similar to the fighting for Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, and Kupiansk (as well as Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka), Russian forces will likely have to conduct a spring–summer offensive on Sloviansk using only the Southern group of forces, advancing frontally from the east, which would entail substantial losses.
For now, it appears that Russian command is hoping to capture Lyman relatively quickly, as it did with Siversk. However, these hopes are increasingly likely to fade, essentially “in parallel” with the prolonged fighting around Lyman.
