By Ivan Kyrychevskyi, a serviceman of the 413th “Raid” Regiment and a Defense Express weapons expert
The idea that the Russians need only a week to significantly strengthen their drone and missile arsenal is, to put it mildly, exaggerated.
The production cycle for such means of attack takes at least several months — roughly speaking, missiles and Shaheds intended for winter strikes have to start being stockpiled in summer.
So a single week is, to put it mildly, nowhere near enough for the Russians to accumulate an additional arsenal. At best, it might suffice only for additional reconnaissance of our energy facilities and for planning new strikes.
The way Russia spends its missiles almost begs to be called a “Schrödinger’s missile arsenal.” In the sense that the aggressor can easily fire off several months’ worth of missile production in a single month and still somehow have reserves for another two or three strikes.
More specifically: in January alone, Russia launched 91 ballistic missiles at us — an amount corresponding to at least two months of production.
At the same time, no one would dare to claim now that the Russians have no ballistic missiles left for new strikes — and this is only the beginning of the month.
Put simply, it looks as if for the Russians themselves this vague “energy truce,” which in any case is not being observed, is merely a tool to “buy time” against the backdrop of negotiations.
