By BA in Economics&Politics, MSc in Comparative Politics (LSE), Solicitor (admitted in England&Wales) Boris Pastukhov
A new bloodbath in the Middle East is drawing ever closer. The issue is not so much the sheer amount of forces the United States has amassed in the region, but the same logic that made Russia’s attack on Ukraine inevitable at the end of 2021: if, after such a large‑scale “rattling of borders” with troops, you pull back without a clear result, you permanently lose the ability to threaten anyone—everyone will simply expect you to pull back again.
There is still a chance to pressure Iran into making sufficiently meaningful concessions that could be presented as a victory and thus limit the bloodshed. But the higher the emotional temperature rises, the more unacceptable it becomes for Tehran to show weakness. If the regime visibly wavers, internal protest could revive strongly enough to shake an already economically fragile system.
Many observers are now looking back at the surgical operation that neutralized Maduro as an active player and are hoping for a similar outcome in Iran. There is no doubt that this would be the best scenario, but it appears unlikely. Power in Iran is not concentrated in a small clan, but in a hierarchical, indoctrinated structure of the IRGC that permeates society; cutting off heads there is far more likely to result in a couple of new ones growing back.
In general, when looking at the increasingly overwhelming imbalance between the forces of the United States and its allies and the weakened forces of Tehran, I cannot help recalling Australia’s war against the emus. In 1932, the Australian authorities sent in the army to “finally solve the emu problem,” as massive flocks were destroying farmland. A regular army with machine guns, rifles, and cavalry was deployed against the huge birds. After a month, having killed nearly 900 emus, the army was forced to retreat and admit defeat. It turned out that if the opponent does not accept the inevitability of defeat and does not count casualties, even an enormous advantage does not guarantee success, while losses—economic, material, and in weapons—force the stronger side to withdraw.
The same logic applies to Iran: U.S. forces may be able to wipe out the country’s top leadership and destroy its armed forces, but if the regime draws on the almost bottomless pool of IRGC members to replenish the ruling ranks and refuses to acknowledge defeat, the prospect of either retreating empty‑handed or entering a futile ground campaign with heavy casualties of its own will quickly loom on the horizon.
