In 2025, the Russian banking system lost key signs of resilience, despite the regulator’s reassuring rhetoric. Banks’ net profit fell by 8% compared to 2024, reaching $45 billion, while return on equity dropped to 18%. The deterioration in financial results occurred against the backdrop of a sharp increase in reserve allocations and rising funding costs caused by tight monetary policy. These indicators point not to cyclical slowdown but to the onset of a deeper systemic dysfunction in the sector.
At the same time, the quality of the loan portfolio is worsening. The share of non-performing loans rose to 11%, and 12% for unsecured loans. Such levels of defaults are incompatible with official claims of stability and indicate systemic problems that can no longer be explained by isolated segments or temporary shocks.
Even analysts close to the Kremlin’s Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting effectively acknowledged the start of a systemic banking crisis. According to their assessment, the current visible stability is maintained not by fundamental recovery but by the dominance of state-owned banks, massive restructurings of troubled assets, and regulatory easing. This model only postpones the crisis while increasing the risk of a rapid and large-scale deposit outflow if the situation worsens.
The declared resilience of the Russian banking system appears artificial. The Central Bank of Russia has effectively shifted to a regime of manual risk management, allowing banks to hide troubled loans under the guise of restructuring. Under these conditions, official data only mask the true scale of losses. The banking sector will inevitably require additional state support, which will increase fiscal and macroeconomic pressure on the Russian economy and cement the crisis as a long-term factor.
