Russia’s gold reserves decreased in 2026 by approximately 15 tons — down to 2,311 tons at the beginning of March compared to 2,326 tons in January. This is the lowest level since March 2022, reflecting the continuous depletion of one of the country’s key financial buffers.
The Russian central bank (CBR) first resorted to selling gold to domestic market participants in November 2025 — a step the regulator had previously avoided, focusing solely on accumulation. Since then, sales have continued, and their scale is increasing.
The mechanism being used highlights the depth of the sanctions’ impact. The CBR exchanges gold for yuan, while commercial banks, which face less severe restrictions, sell the metal on external markets, keeping the proceeds to support their own liquidity.
Russia’s total international reserves fell in February from $833.6 billion to $809.3 billion. However, the real picture is much worse: about $300 billion of this sum consists of frozen assets, inaccessible for use. Gold accounts for nearly 47% of the reserves, effectively becoming the only liquid instrument available to the Kremlin.
Pressure on the reserves is driven by several factors simultaneously: the need to cover the budget deficit, being cut off from reserve currencies due to sanctions, and the desire to maintain yuan liquidity for currency interventions. All of this occurs against the backdrop of the opposite global trend — most central banks worldwide continue to increase their gold reserves as a tool for diversification and protection from dollar dependence.
This dynamic reveals the structural vulnerability of Russia’s financial system. Gold has become a short-term substitute for liquidity rather than a strategic reserve. At the same time, dependence on the yuan and China’s financial infrastructure is growing — a dependence that Beijing is unlikely to consider burdensome.
