Military analyst Anders Nielsen of the Royal Danish Defence College on Putin's possible next steps:
The Russian-Ukrainian war is approaching a moment when Putin needs to make a decision. Ukrainians are continuously intensifying strikes with their long-range UAVs and drones. Strikes against Russian infantry at the front are resulting in recruitment levels for the Russian Armed Forces falling below combat losses. Strikes at operational depth are also increasing, making front-line operations even more difficult. Putin has four main options for further action. These should be analysed against three criteria that are key for him: the ability to win the war, the ability to save the economy, and the threat to the regime.
The first option is concluding a genuine ceasefire. By doing so, the Russians would effectively abandon any claims to victory. Moreover, since Russia has declared the full annexation of four Ukrainian regions, relinquishing them would mean, by formal legal logic, that they ended the war by handing "their" territory to Ukraine. However, this option would allow for the beginning of economic recovery. The risks to regime stability are moderate: while many embittered veterans will return to the rear, the majority of the population is war-weary and would welcome a ceasefire.
The second option is abandoning the offensive and freezing the front line while maintaining combat operations and strikes on rear areas. This could potentially be supplemented by a ban on Ukrainians striking Russian oil refineries, and a corresponding ban on Russians striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure. This is the most difficult option for Ukraine: the current strategy involves both striking refineries and destroying large numbers of Russian military personnel in order to prevent Russia from building up reserves. On the other hand, this option is risky for the Russian economy, as it still requires significant resources, though it is favourable for the stability of the Russian regime. At the same time, such an endless war could also be dangerous for Ukraine's sustainability.
The third option is full-scale mobilisation in Russia. On one hand, it is comparatively easy to carry out; on the other, it is a very risky option. Even bringing in an additional 300,000–500,000 soldiers would not resolve Russia's other military problems. The chances of winning the war under this option remain low, the chances of saving the economy are zero, and the risks to the regime are the highest of all options.
The fourth option is escalation — most likely an attack against the Baltic states. The Russians have sufficient resources for a limited invasion by several divisions. The aim of such an invasion would be either to force Europeans to redirect all resources toward defending NATO members while abandoning Ukraine, or to frighten Europeans enough that they agree to any demands regarding Ukraine. This option carries very serious risks for the Russian regime if Europeans respond by further increasing support for Ukraine, but offers a major payoff if Europeans are intimidated into capitulating. In any case, Europe would be better off preparing for the possibility of such a scenario.
Nielsen believes that the most advantageous option for Russia would be to halt the offensive while maintaining a limited war. However, Putin has consistently chosen options other than what Nielsen considered most logical, and it appears this will be the case again. Moreover, Putin is convinced of his sacred mission to "restore Russia's greatness," which necessarily entails the conquest of Ukraine. Most likely, Russian generals will convince Putin that an additional wave of mobilisation can solve the problem of a front-line breakthrough. This option follows the most obvious logic from a Russian perspective, yet is also the most risky for them.
