The Kremlin has launched a new international information operation. Its goal is to blur the image of the aggressor country by shifting the narrative from “Russians versus Ukrainians” to “the right kind of Ukrainians versus Ukrainians.” This is not the first attempt by Kremlin PR strategists to recast the full-scale war as a civil conflict, in which Russia supposedly merely “supports the disgraced brotherly people.” Similar messages were actively promoted after the temporary occupation of Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014—and now they are gaining traction again.
Recently, several well-known Russian media politicians and Kremlin aides have “suddenly remembered” their Ukrainian origins. The phenomenon is quite logical: according to the 2021 Russian census, Ukrainians ranked eighth in population size, so some indeed built careers within Kremlin corridors. However, it is clear that the order to no longer identify exclusively as “Russian” came from the very top. According to Moscow’s official logic, the “right” Ukrainians are those who understand and support Russia’s imperial ambitions and have long since become Russian citizens. These are the people expected to conduct potential dialogue with Ukraine.
At the end of February, Russia’s UN ambassador Vasily Nebenzya boasted of his “sincere” Ukrainian roots during a Security Council meeting. The message was immediately picked up by a well-known collaborator, now Special Envoy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Radion Miroshnik, who went further, attempting to prove the exemplary nature of his Ukrainian surname. Notably, it is representatives of Russia’s diplomatic corps who have been “highlighting” Ukrainian origins. All this is happening against the backdrop of the “main” Russian negotiators, Vladimir Medinsky and Kirill Dmitriev, who are known to have been born in Cherkasy Oblast and Kyiv, respectively.
The logic of the operation is clear. If the international community accepts the narrative that “Ukrainians are fighting Ukrainians” and “negotiating among themselves,” it opens the door for Moscow to downgrade the status of the conflict under international law. A lower status means lower responsibility: fewer reparations to Ukraine, fewer convictions in international courts. The campaign is deliberately timed now, as the international community plans to begin work on the Special Tribunal on the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine by the end of 2026.
Valentina Matviyenko, Dmitry Medvedev, Sergey Shoigu, Sergey Kiriyenko—all have a share of Ukrainian blood. But they will probably recall this only when sitting on the defendant’s bench.
