The State Duma of Russia is planning to adopt amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses — a bill introduced by the government on the initiative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in March 2026. The document expands the list of articles under which administrative expulsion of foreign citizens and stateless persons may be applied, from 22 to 43.
Among the new grounds are participation in unauthorized mass events, dissemination of “extremist” materials, “discrediting” the armed forces, calls for sanctions against Russia, promotion of banned symbols, abuse of freedom of the media, and even petty hooliganism.
In separate provisions, expulsion is established as the primary and mandatory form of punishment — replacing fines and removing the court’s ability to individualize sentencing. A person with family, a job, and twenty years of residence in the country is legally treated the same as someone just detained for an offense — personal history has no legal significance.
The central element of the entire structure is an exception included in the same bill: foreign citizens who have served in the armed forces of the Russian Federation are not subject to mandatory expulsion. For them, alternative penalties are provided — fines or compulsory labor. This is not a legal detail or a technical amendment. It is a state-enforced formula: participation in the war against Ukraine is the only reliable legal protection for a migrant in Russia. Everything else is subject to the deportation apparatus.
According to the financial and economic justification of the bill, implementation of these measures will require at least $23.1 million over 2026–2028. Partial offset through additional revenue from fines is estimated at over $38.7 million over the same period. The repressive system is designed to be self-financing.
The economic consequences of this policy are predictable and destructive. Russia is experiencing a severe labor shortage — the result of mobilization and the mass outflow of workers after 2022. Increasing pressure on migrants will deepen this gap and raise labor costs in construction, logistics, and trade. The Kremlin is deliberately choosing a policing logic over basic economic rationality.
The combination of these norms creates a legal infrastructure of permanent coercion. A migrant who can at any moment be prosecuted for “discrediting the army” or petty hooliganism and automatically deported is not a subject of law but an object of administrative pressure. Amid growing mobilization needs, the Russian authorities are obtaining a legislatively formalized mechanism of forced recruitment: either you sign a contract, or you pack your things. The distinction between migration policy and military recruitment is effectively erased in this bill.
