The Kremlin has no remaining option that will not lead the regime to collapse. In the economy — catastrophe, on the battlefield — catastrophe, with allies — catastrophe. But even freezing the war will not save Putin. Here is why.
First, a rough estimate of how many Russians are today directly or indirectly working for the war.
The size of the armed forces is about 1.5 million people. Of these, about 700,000 are directly in the combat zone. In addition, the National Guard (Rosgvardia) has about 340,000 personnel. Plus the FSB, FSO, FSIN — several hundred thousand more. In total, around 2.5 million people are in security structures.
About 3.5 million people are directly employed in the military-industrial complex. Plus related industries that are also now mostly working for the war: metallurgy (steel, titanium, aluminum), chemicals (gunpowder, explosives, composites), electronics (every missile requires chips, boards, connectors), general machinery, logistics, and transport. This is another 2–3 million jobs largely tied to military orders. Salaries in the defense industry have risen several times, pulling workers away from other sectors.
Plus the state apparatus. Plus state media, Z-bloggers, patriotic NGOs, military correspondents, and all structures involved in mobilization and fundraising for the front — another several hundred thousand people.
Plus their families. Mobilized soldiers and contract servicemen may have wives, children, and parents who also benefit from the war economy: hundreds of thousands of rubles in signing bonuses, salaries of 200–300 thousand rubles per month (several times higher than the average salary in their regions), and payments to the wounded and families of the dead. In total, around 15–20 million Russians receive a significant share of their income from the war economy.
What happens if the war stops right now?
Problem No. 1 — an immediate economic shock from the reduction of military spending. Military expenditures today are about 7–8% of GDP according to official data, and around 10–12% in reality. The Kremlin is desperately trying to hide the real figures. Most of this money flows into domestic production chains — wages have grown, and crediting of the defense sector has been unprecedented.
What happens if it stops? A simplified chain reaction: tank contracts are reduced by 70% — the Uralvagonzavod plant in Nizhny Tagil loses orders — 15–20 thousand workers are moved to part-time work or laid off — demand for steel and electronics falls — subcontractors lose workload — regional incomes fall — tax revenues drop — the region requests subsidies from a federal budget that is already short of funds. This is a classic “demobilization recession” that historically occurs after major wars. In the United States after 1945, GDP fell by about 11% in 1946, and only the scale of the American civilian economy allowed rapid adjustment. In the USSR in the 1990s, defense conversion was catastrophic — factories simply shut down, and millions of skilled workers turned to criminal activity or informal trade.
Problem No. 2 — returning soldiers. According to various estimates, around one million Russians have passed through the war (including rotations, mobilized personnel, contract soldiers, prisoners from “Storm Z” and Wagner units). Some of them have died or been disabled; the rest will return home when the war ends. These are people with combat experience and, more importantly, access to weapons or familiarity with them.
These are people who were earning 200–300 thousand rubles per month — three to five times more than at home. They were promised hero status. They have benefits, military awards, and the belief that they are heroes. What will they receive? Employment in the defense industry will already be reduced; there are no civilian jobs with such salaries. They will no longer be considered heroes — “you went for money anyway.”
700,000 trained, armed, and frustrated people in one country are more than enough to destabilize Russia from within. And most importantly, these people are organized. They have networks, chats, commanders, acquaintances, and combat brotherhoods. In Germany after World War I, six million disillusioned veterans returned, and from their environment arose both the SS and the ideology of “we were stabbed in the back while we were fighting.”
Problem No. 3 — ideological. Today Russia controls less territory in Ukraine than four years ago. The “Kyiv in three days” plan failed. Ukraine remains free and has become much stronger than it was before the war. The Russian professional army has been destroyed, the Black Sea Fleet has been sunk, combat aviation is nearly gone, air defenses have been heavily degraded, and the vast Soviet strategic reserves have been burned in the war. Sanctions will not be lifted, and losses are enormous. “What did we bleed for?”
Problem No. 4 — elite fragmentation. The war has created a new class of beneficiaries: commanders who earned billions from the war, military bloggers with millions of followers, security service officers, and defense industry industrialists (now among the richest Russians). This is a new elite with its own interests. If the war is frozen, they lose everything — status, budgets, access. And these are people with resources and access to weapons. The most far-sighted among them are already creating their own armed formations. And this is not limited to Chechnya.
Problem No. 5 — regional dimension. The war has temporarily reduced inequality between poor regions and the center through payments to soldiers. Buryatia, Tuva, the Caucasus — money has flowed there that they have not seen for years. In rural areas of poor regions, compensation for a killed soldier (5–7 million rubles) can lift a family from poverty into the middle class. If the war stops, this transfer disappears.
And all this is happening while sanctions remain, the technological gap is growing, demographics are worsening, and social fatigue is accumulating. The Kremlin has fallen into a trap where prolonging the war seems cheaper than ending it, but in the long term leads to ever greater problems. The longer the war continues, the harder it becomes to exit it. But continuing it is already becoming смертельно dangerous.
For the first time, it can be said honestly that Ukraine is beginning to win this war.
