On the night of May 1, the Russian forces carried out another raid on Odesa, during which they struck civilian infrastructure and residential buildings. Another act of terror for the sake of terror, but with a new tactic that the Russian forces regularly refine.
Firstly, this time the Shahed-136 drones approached Odesa in two waves: the first group consisted of 6 drones, and the second group had 13. One Shahed-136 continued to circle the airspace at a safe distance in the Black Sea until the raid was over.
It might seem like just a few waves of attacks, so what's new? The distinguishing feature was that the first wave entered at altitudes of 500 meters, which generally made them accessible targets for all types of defensive weapons.
However, the second wave approached the city at altitudes of 2-2.5 kilometers, making them inaccessible to mobile fire groups and certain types of air defense systems (ZSU) placed along the coastline. But beyond the shoreline, in areas with dense multi-story buildings, the Shahed-136 drones quickly descended to altitudes of 500 meters before delivering their strikes.
Why is this the case?
Because the occupiers are not idiots, and they understand that most of the mobile groups are located in the coastal zone, as well as the ZSU. Therefore, they cross this section at altitudes of 2-2.5 kilometers. But when they reach residential areas, especially with multi-story buildings, where using mobile fire groups and ZSU poses risks, they lower their altitude, as strikes from 2-2.5 kilometers would result in a catastrophic loss of accuracy.
The main entry zones for the Shahed-136 into Odessa are also chosen at altitudes of 2-2.5 kilometers, and they are quite specific – Arcadia, Delyphine, Otrada, 10th Station of the Fontana, etc. For example, shooting down a Shahed-136 in Arcadia guarantees consequences for the high-rise buildings that are there. But...
I have repeatedly mentioned how difficult the situation is in Odessa in terms of counteracting Shahed-136 terror. And if we are talking about their effective destruction, it should not be done over the city or the coastline but over the sea! But for this, we need a sufficient number of short-range air defense systems or airborne interceptors, such as light attack helicopters and turboprop attack aircraft. But with each of these components, the question of ammunition arises.
Will there be enough missiles and other munitions if the number of raids increases?
And here we return to the basic protection system – electronic warfare (REW)!
I have repeatedly written, spoken, and commented that for Odessa, the basic protection system against Shahed-136 should be a block-type REW – creating squares from the coastline and deep into the city itself. This is the basic defense for the city, working 24/7 under any conditions, from which all other air defense systems are based.
But, you know what is the saddest part?
Odessa, one of the wealthiest cities in Ukraine, with one of the highest densities of oligarchs per square meter, is the only region that has not approached the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to request services for creating an REW network!
Such projects have been implemented in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, even Zhytomyr, and in other cities, they are either at the initial or final stages, but in Odessa, no one is concerned about this. Although obtaining the necessary approval, creating the project for the network, and setting it up usually takes around 3 months.
If anyone has forgotten, the first Shahed-136 raid on Odessa took place in August 2022. It's been three months already... Of course, it's much easier to visit the site where an entire family was killed by a kamikaze drone strike, with a sorrowful face and words of sympathy, followed by curses for the occupiers, than to allocate funds to protect these families.
