By Vitaliy Kulyk, Director of the Center for Civil Society Studies, exclusively for Glavred.
Recent opinion polls in Hungary present a mixed picture, so it is still too early to speak about a clear advantage for any particular political force. Although the opposition party “Tisza” is showing growing support and in some surveys even surpasses Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s party “Fidesz,” this does not yet guarantee a change of power.
According to estimates by the Hungarian research center 21 Kutatóközpont, “Tisza” could receive around 48%, while Orbán’s political force, “Fidesz,” about 44%. In reality, there is also a third political force — “Our Homeland.” It is a right-centrist party inclined toward alliances with Viktor Orbán. As a result, together with it, Orbán could form a parliamentary majority.
In addition, there are about a dozen constituencies that “Tisza” could potentially win. However, in these districts there is a significant share of voters who do not trust either “Tisza” or “Fidesz.” Other political forces are also present on the scene, including the “Democratic Coalition,” as well as a satirical political project — the Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party. This is a humorous force that mocks the entire political system of the country. It is often supported by young voters, especially in Budapest, more as a joke than out of serious political motives. These are exactly the votes that “Tisza” may lack for victory.
Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that after the elections it will be Orbán who forms the majority and becomes prime minister again, even if another force formally wins in terms of percentage.
For this reason, Orbán should not be written off the political stage. There is a significant likelihood that he could retain power through a coalition, even without a single-party majority. He has repeatedly demonstrated his effectiveness in negotiations and his ability to maintain agreements with political allies, which is why others may be willing to cooperate with him.
If he returns, more difficult times could lie ahead for the European Union. The question will arise of how to engage with him, particularly on how to bypass the veto not only on Ukraine-related issues, but also in areas such as energy, defense, and other policy fields.
In theory, the European Union has tools to limit Hungary’s influence. For example, by changing procedural mechanisms, some decisions can be shifted from the level of the EU Council to committees, allowing blockages to be bypassed. In addition, changes could be introduced to limit Hungary’s political participation, creating a demonstrative case of “punishment” within the EU — something that could hypothetically be pursued to signal consequences to other countries, including Slovakia, Poland, or Italy. This could involve blocking funding and subsidies, depriving voting rights, restricting participation in policymaking processes, or excluding Hungary from committees.
However, this is difficult and requires strong political will. Many member states, observing the potential “punishment” of Orbán, may project this situation onto themselves, and therefore not all will be ready to support tough measures. Nevertheless, in theory, instruments to limit his influence within the EU do exist.
What is most interesting is that in Ukraine there are somewhat inflated expectations regarding a possible victory of Péter Magyar’s “Tisza.” It is often assumed that the party is pro-Ukrainian, but this does not entirely correspond to reality. In fact, Magyar uses rhetoric similar to Orbán’s, only packaged in a more pro-European form, avoiding sharp statements and direct accusations, yet he is likely to continue an unfriendly policy toward Ukraine. It will be quite difficult to counter him in a European context, because it will not be the anti-European Orbán speaking, but the pro-European Magyar promoting essentially the same agenda toward Ukraine.
It will also be difficult, if not impossible, to “punish” Magyar. He may take a critical stance toward Ukraine, particularly regarding the scale of financial assistance, arguing that it risks the “disarmament of Europe” — wording he himself has used. Therefore, I do not expect Budapest to make a 180-degree turn toward Ukraine after a Magyar victory. Only certain adjustments are possible.
Ukraine will have to seek a workable modus of relations. A window of opportunity may emerge for Kyiv and Budapest to find common ground on certain issues, but this will require concessions from Ukraine. These may include matters related to language, culture, and the rights of national minorities. Economic issues will also remain important, particularly oil transit, which cannot simply be abandoned.
Therefore, solutions will have to be found and responses developed to these challenges. Magyar is unlikely to abandon the Druzhba pipeline or Russian oil, despite his current rhetoric. Accordingly, negotiation points will need to be identified: making concessions in some areas while defending positions in others.
Ultimately, relations will need to be gradually moved out of the current deadlock, as under Orbán any opportunities for understanding are virtually absent. At the same time, with Magyar there may be a limited but real window for dialogue.
If Orbán and his party win again, the next step will likely be an attempt by the European Union to limit Hungary’s voting rights and use of the veto. In response, Orbán will escalate the situation and raise the stakes. He may initiate new anti-Ukrainian steps, block Brussels’ initiatives, and move toward open confrontation. At the beginning of a new political cycle, with a strong mandate, he is likely to actively use confrontation with Brussels.
He may also claim that the European Union and NATO are ineffective, and at times even raise the issue of Hungary potentially leaving the EU, especially if the security situation in Europe worsens — for example in the Baltic region — and the EU fails to protect a country like Estonia. Various scenarios are therefore possible.
In addition, propaganda campaigns are likely to intensify, and right-wing populist forces within the EU may begin to orient themselves toward Hungary. Hungary is supported by Trump and the MAGA movement, which would strengthen Orbán’s position. In this context, he could be perceived as one of the centers shaping a new political configuration in Europe. In other words, there are many possible configurations that could steer Europe toward another “iceberg.”
As for Hungary potentially leaving the EU, Orbán is more likely to use the idea of a “Huxit” as a tool of pressure rather than a real objective. In practice, a full exit from the EU, after going through all procedures, would be more of a disadvantage than a benefit for him.
Such a move would mean losing significant financial resources — namely EU subsidies and assistance that support Hungary’s budget. Since the country needs to cover social spending, much of it is financed through EU funds. Exiting would raise the question of where to find alternative funding — potentially from China or Russia — but whether Hungary could secure sufficient resources from these sources remains uncertain.
Therefore, it is more advantageous for Orbán to remain in the EU while exerting pressure on Brussels and negotiating, rather than seeking alternative funding sources. He will likely use exit rhetoric as a means of leverage, not as an actual plan.
At the same time, if the European Union faces a serious internal crisis or challenges it cannot effectively respond to, Hungary could theoretically become one of the first countries to consider leaving.
As for Magyar, even with pro-European rhetoric, his actions may differ in practice. He may speak of a “new beginning” in relations with the EU and shared values, but in voting he may align not with mainstream forces such as the European People’s Party, but rather show greater solidarity with right-wing or far-right actors, for example conservative political players in Poland, rather than countries like Germany or France.
