By Viktor Yahun
On the night of September 11, Russia once again attacked Ukraine. The Air Force reported the use of S8000 Banderol missiles and 161 strike UAVs, 138 of which were shot down or suppressed. Strikes were recorded at 19 locations. In Kyiv, at least eight people were injured and a fire broke out in a nine-storey residential building.
A day earlier, Pavlohrad suffered one of its heaviest attacks in recent months: seven people were killed and 76 injured. In Dnipro, a Russian strike hit a sunflower processing plant belonging to US company Bunge, while in Kyiv an Ukrnafta petrol station was hit.
This is no longer merely a campaign against the energy sector. A systematic effort to put pressure on logistics, food production, fuel networks, warehouses, transport hubs and border crossings is becoming increasingly apparent.
The objective is clear: to make the very functioning of the country more expensive — supplies, exports, production and transportation — and to approach the autumn and winter period with maximum economic and psychological pressure on Ukrainian society.
The situation on the front is difficult, but not catastrophic. On September 10, the General Staff recorded 235 combat engagements, 114 Russian air strikes involving 365 guided aerial bombs and more than 10,800 kamikaze drones. The largest number of attacks — 33 — took place in the Pokrovsk sector.
At the same time, ISW has recorded Ukrainian counterattacks near Lyman and explicitly points to systematic exaggeration by the Russian military command of its own advances. On September 9, the Institute did not confirm advances by either side.
The threat of local breakthroughs remains real. But open-source data does not support the narrative of a “collapse of the Ukrainian front”.
No less important is the second front: the long-range war. Ukraine continues to strike Russian oil refineries, ports, warships, radar systems, UAV command posts and logistics.
The logic is simple: force Russia to spend increasingly more resources protecting its own rear, stretch its air defences across thousands of kilometres and steadily increase the real cost of continuing the war.
The diplomatic track has effectively been put on hold until Russia’s State Duma elections on September 20. Zelensky has said that he does not expect serious trilateral negotiations before then, although contacts with the American side are continuing.
The Kremlin is therefore likely to use the coming days to intensify military and information pressure, attempting to enter the next round of negotiations with the most favourable possible “picture” of the situation.
And here, a fundamentally new element has emerged.
ISW has documented Russian sources using AI-generated or AI-modified videos as “evidence” of control over settlements that Russia has not actually captured.
This means that even geolocated video can no longer automatically be treated as proof without examining the image itself, its origin, possible signs of manipulation and independent corroboration.
Western support is not disappearing. Instead, it is gradually entering an industrial phase.
Canada has announced around CAD 350 million for urgently needed air defence interceptors and almost CAD 435 million in loan guarantees to strengthen Ukraine’s energy resilience. Ottawa also plans to scale up drone production, with around one-third of output expected to be allocated to Ukraine.
NATO says allies have provided more than $10 billion over the past year through the PURL mechanism and US Foreign Military Sales.
The key shortage, however, remains unchanged: air defence and a sufficient number of interceptor missiles.
There is also an important external dimension.
Poland is now openly preparing for possible Russian attacks or sabotage against crossings on the Ukrainian-Polish border. Reuters has also reported a disrupted operation by Russia’s Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research near Svalbard, involving activities close to critical undersea cables.
This is no longer an abstract “hybrid threat”. It is practical preparation for operations capable of affecting the logistics and communications of NATO countries.
There is also a harsh lesson at home.
In the case involving an ammunition depot in Mila, where 35 people were killed following a Russian strike and subsequent detonations, Ukraine’s State Bureau of Investigation has announced that an SSU official has been served with a notice of suspicion.
The root cause of the tragedy was the Russian strike. But war cannot become an exemption from official accountability.
A strong state must be capable of both calling the aggressor an aggressor and investigating its own mistakes.
An additional risk comes from the Middle East: Brent crude closed at $107.63 per barrel on September 10. Persistently high oil prices provide Russia with an additional source of foreign currency, although they do not negate the effects of sanctions or Ukrainian strikes against its oil and gas infrastructure.
The main information threat in the coming days is not the Russian claim that “we have won”. That is too obviously at odds with reality.
The more dangerous narrative is different: “Ukraine cannot protect its rear” → “the economy is being exhausted” → “the West is too late” → “the front is supposedly collapsing” → “Putin supposedly offers peace” → “therefore, further resistance is pointless”.
This is precisely the narrative the Kremlin is now constructing — through strikes, propaganda, AI-generated falsifications, diplomatic pauses and pressure on the civilian economy.
Its goal is not to prove that Russia has won. Its goal is to convince us that a Ukrainian victory is supposedly impossible.
That is why the most important thing today is not to confuse a sober assessment of the situation with an imposed sense of hopelessness.
Russia is trying to win not only on the battlefield. It is trying to win in our perception of the war.
And that is precisely what it must not be allowed to do.
