One way or another, life in Russia will change significantly after the elections, and hardly for the better. I expect two consequences: a major reshuffle within the system, accompanied by tectonic shifts among the security agencies and clashes between them, as well as tougher measures to replenish the army’s ranks.
The first will affect not only the FSB, which is currently the subject of much discussion, but also the Presidential Administration and the government. The second will not be called mobilisation, but in practice it will be harsher than in the autumn of 2022, because everyone has long since been counted and there is no longer any way to escape from this submarine.
Putin is unlikely to be counting on a quick end to the war and is probably planning to find a way out of it sometime in the spring, on his own terms. Until then, for as long as he can keep going, he will pursue two parallel strategies: courting Trump and intimidating Europe. Europe, meanwhile, will for a time find itself fighting a war on two fronts — against Putin, openly and obviously, and against Trump, less obviously and more covertly.
However, it would be difficult to say that the Kremlin has any clear plan. It is more likely to have a vague idea of the direction in which it would like events to develop. Within this framework, the emphasis appears to be on the winter campaign of 2026–2027. During October and November, they will scrape together the additional cannon fodder they need and, after a brief period of training, throw them into the furnace of war by the New Year.
As absurd as it may sound, Putin genuinely intends to sell reaching the borders of the Donetsk region as a victory. Deep down, however, he hopes that achieving this objective will trigger a coup in Kyiv and finally give him the personal satisfaction of seeing Zelensky removed from power. After that, negotiations could begin — with anyone, about anything, but just not with HIM.
All of this looks remarkably dull and petty. But then again, this war has virtually no other purpose beyond satisfying the personal ambitions of one man and those who have attached themselves to his power. So satisfying those ambitions could, in itself, prove sufficient reason to end the war.
