Main image: The bridge connecting Estonia with Russia seen from Narva, Estonia, July 2024. (Sipa US/Alamy Live News)
The FSB is using travelers to build intelligence networks in Europe, warns the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as reported by theparliamentmagazine.
Estonian citizens crossing the border with Russia may be coerced into spying against their own country, as recent cases and investigations by Estonian security services have shown. Estonian authorities have tightened travel recommendations to Russia, noting that Russian intelligence officers may threaten travelers, blackmail them, or force them to gather information.
Estonia’s Attorney General, Taavi Pern, stated that citizens may face pressure from the FSB and can never know in advance what they will encounter. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs warns of possible confiscation of electronic devices, arrests over materials critical of Russia, forced involvement in espionage, or even conscription into the Russian military.
Individuals with dual citizenship are particularly at risk. Several cases have been recorded where Estonian citizens came under the scrutiny of Russian security forces due to their views. Daily, 1,000–1,500 pedestrians cross the Narva border checkpoint, and several hundred pass through southern crossings. Many Estonians have relatives in Russia and maintain cultural ties. Some travelers cross the border for commercial purposes, transporting goods, some of which are illegal.
Estonian intelligence has long been combating Russian espionage. In 2025, in Narva, Pavel Kapustin, a Russian citizen, was convicted for cooperating with the FSB, spying against Estonia, providing false information to state authorities, and violating sanctions. He passed confidential information to the Russian service about the demolition of a military monument and local sentiment toward Wagner Group mercenaries. Experts suggest he may have been coerced into cooperation.
The FSB uses classic coercion methods: financial vulnerability, blackmail, exploitation of compromises and pro-Russian sympathies, as well as social media to create target profiles. FSB officers develop a “target package” to determine the best approach to an individual—from friendly engagement to coercion. The officers themselves rarely travel abroad, relying on local recruits to establish links with foreign targets.
Russia’s hybrid tactics affect not only Estonia but other European countries as well. Czech security services report that the FSB recruits migrants via Telegram to engage in criminal activities aimed at weakening social cohesion, undermining trust in authorities, and reducing support for Ukraine. In Germany, three citizens were charged in May 2025 for cooperating with Russian intelligence.
This activity is especially dangerous for former Soviet republics like Estonia. Experts note that Russia actively interferes in the affairs of 7 of the 15 countries that emerged after the Soviet Union’s collapse, carrying out military occupation or hostilities against them. These states remain vulnerable to Russian espionage due to historical ties and their location within Russia’s sphere of influence, which it views as part of its internal space.
